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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
simply directed at some of the abuses which have developed under it.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended by this statute, is still
the law in this field. The Norris-La Guardia Act still limits the juris-
diction of the federal courts to issue injunctions at the request of
private parties involved in a labor dispute.
Thus, labor has come of age. It has become more and more appar-
ent to workers that they have the right of self-organization, and
employers are rapidly gaining the realization that unions are largely
controlled by the desires of the majority, which must be recognized.
There is no need for the courts to fight labor's battles of a generation
ago. The conditions which initially won the sympathy of the public
and later of the courts no longer exist. The cause of the disputes in
the Duplex and Bedford Cut Stone cases would hardly arise today.
Labor has won its battle for recognition and must now shoulder its
responsibilities. It will be the duty of the Board, the courts, and the
higher tribunal of public opinion to nullify any attempts to defeat the
cause of reasonable wages, hours, and working conditions, a cause so
vital to a healthy nation.
CLAUDE E. TAYLOR, JR.
THE REEMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
To date more than one hundred court decisions have been rendered
interpreting the reemployment provision of the Selective Training
and Service Act.1 An examination of these decisions now makes pos-
sible the formulation of some conclusions as to the effectiveness of the
legislation in achieving its purposes, and also reveals the chief dis-
agreements which have developed between employers and returning
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees." The National Labor Relations Act in its
declaration of policy in § 1, above, recognized the need for equality of bargaining
power. This policy was retained in § 1 of Title i of the Taft-Hartley Act.
15o U. S. C. A. Appendix Sec. 3o8 (1944), as amended by Sec. 357; Sept. 16, 1940,
c. 720, Sec. 8, 54 Stat. 89o, as amended Aug. 18, 1941, c. 362, Sec. 7, 55 Stat. 627 and
July 28, 1942, c. 529, Sec. 2, 56 Stat. 724.
Persons in the Reserve Land or Naval Forces who were on active duty are
covered by the Army Reserve and Retired Personnel Service Law of 1940, 50
U. S. C. A. Appendix Sec. 403 (1944); Aug. 27, 1940, c. 689, Sec. 3, 54 Stat. 859, as
amended Sept. 16, 1940, c. 720, Sec. 8 (d), (f), 54 Stat. 891, July 28, 1942, c. 529, Sec.
1, 56 Stat. 723, which has reemployment provisions practically identical to the
Selective Service Act. McClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md.
1946); Wright v. Weaver Bros., 56 F. Supp. 595 (D. C. Md. 144).
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servicemen, and even among the courts, concerning the meaning of
certain ,portions of the statute.
In general, the Act provides that any person who, in order to per-
form training and service in the armed forces of the United States, left
"a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any em-
ployer"2 and entered upon such training and service subsequent to
May 1, 194o, shall be restored "to such position or to a position of like
seniority, status, and pay." However, this right is given to such a per-
son only if he: (i) receives an honorable discharge, (2) "is still quali-
fied to perform the duties of such position," and (8) applies for re-
employment within go days "after he is relieved from such training
and service." Moreover, the employer is excused from this obligation to
reinstate veteran employees if "the employer's circumstances have so
changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so." The federal
district courts are empowered to require employers to comply spe-
cifically with the above provisions, and to compensate the veteran em-
ployee "for any loss of wages or benefits" suffered by reason of the
employer's non-compliance.
Purpose of the Provision
The declaration of Congress in the preamble of the Selective Train-
ing and Service Act that "the obligations and privileges of military
training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a
fair and just system," is an expression of the general purpose of the
entire Act, and serves as a justification for the reemployment require-
ment. This purpose of promoting the sharing of the burden of mili-
tary service, so that the veteran "was not penalized on his return by
reason of his absence from his civilian job," has been expressly recog-
nized in several decisions.3 Undoubtedly Congress also had in mind
2The Reemployment Provisions are mandatory upon the United States Govern-
ment, its Territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, and upon private
employers, Rosario v. Department of Labor of Puerto Rico, 68 F. Supp. i (D. C. P. R.
1946). As to any state or political subdivision thereof, the Act is not mandatory, but
provides that "it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that such per-
son [employee of state, etc.], should be restored to such position or to a position
of like seniority, status, and pay." McLaughlin v. Retherford, 2o7 Ark. 1o94, 184
S. W. (2d) 461 (1944); Crowell v. Jackson Parish School Board, 28 S. (2d) 81 (La.
1946).
3Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 284, 66 S. Ct. iio5,
uu, go L. ed. 123o (1946); McCarthy v. M. & M. Transp. Co., 16Q F. (2d) 322, 323
(C. C. A. ist, '947); Freeman v. Gateway Baking Co., 68 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W. D. Ark.
1946).
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the prevention of any repetition of the widespread unemployment of
veterans which followed World War I. That "the Act... [was] a signif-
icant force in the maintenance of the morale of our military forces"4
was due in large measure to the fact that it enabled the serviceman "to
render the best he had for his country unworried by the specter of no
payment during the first year after he returned to civilian life."5
The amendment of the Act in 1941, so that it covered not only in-
ductees but also volunteers, was designed for the double purpose of giv-
ing equal post-war employment rights to both groups and of encourag-
ing the expansion of our armed forces through voluntary enlistments.
Under this amendment it has been held that employees in deferred
classifications who resigned their jobs in order to be available for in-
duction,6 or in order to volunteer for induction 7 are entitled to re-
employment. However, a federal judge who resigned his position to en-
ter military service was denied the right to be restored to the bench.8
In the latter case the court employed the somewhat inconclusive reason-
ing that since Congress had expressly deferred judges from induction,
the intention was also to exclude them from the provision for re-
employment in the same position.
Another purpose of the legislation, which has been stressed in sev-
eral decisions, is to aid the veteran in effecting his own rehabilitation
by returning promptly to civilian work. For example, it has been said
that one purpose of the reemployment guaranty is "to return [the ser-
viceman] to his position so that he might be rehabilitated by the chance
to do the things which he had left when he entered his country's de-
fense activities;" 9 or, as otherwise expressed, "to make it possible for
persons whose skills have been blunted by war service to regain them
by actual usage in the course of regular employment."'10 In recognition
of this objective, it has been decided that an employer who offered
merely to pay a veteran for one year's work in lieu of reemploying
him had not complied with the statute."
'Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817, 819 (E. D. Ky. 1944).5Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, 67 F. Supp. 705, 7o8 (W. D. Wash.
1946).
6BIackford v. Nashville Gas 8: Heating Co., 68 F. Supp. 997 (M. D. Tenn. 1946);
Bentubo v. Boston & M. R. R., 66 F. Supp. 91o (D. C. Mass. 1946), aff'd 16o F. (Rd)
326 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
"Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hayes, i6o F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
'Clark v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 594 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
'Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, 67 F. Supp. 705, 708 (W. D. Wash.
1946).
"Dacey v. Bethelehem Steel Co., 66 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. C. Mass. 1946).




Almost half of the cases taken to the courts have involved a dis-
agreement as to whether the plaintiff veteran had left "a position, other
than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer." Five main
types of cases which have arisen requiring an interpretation of the
quoted phrase are those in which: (i) the employer contended the
veteran was an independent contractor rather than an employee; (2)
the position was allegedly temporary; (3) seasonal or casual workers
were concerned; (4) the employee's term of elective office or term of
employment had expired while he was away in the armed forces; and
(5) controversies arose as to whether the veteran was actually an em-
ployee immediately prior to his entrance into military service.
Clearly a discharged sailor who had been manager of defendant's
taxi business was an employee, 12 and an operator of a liquor concession
in an incorporated dub was an independent contractor.13 But less cer-
tainty exists in classifying a golf pro who operated a golf shop rent
free on the premises of a golf club, where he also gave instructions at
a price fixed by the dub, collected green fees and charge slips for the
dub, was in charge of all tournaments, and could be discharged by the
Board of Directors if his work was not satisfactory. Stating that the
Act embraced more than is included in the orthodox definition of em-
ployee, the court held that the golf pro was an "employee."' 14
The "right to control" test has been applied in a number of cases
to determine whether an employment situation existed. A salesman
who was not controlled by his employer nor directed as to how, when,
and where to solicit orders was declared to be an independent con-
tractor.' 5 The opposite result was reached in another case, where the
terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties showed that the
salesman's activities were controlled by the employer, even though the
written contract expressly stated that the salesman was an independent
contractor.16 Similarly, a person who hauled rubbish from defendants'
three stores at an agreed monthly price in his own truck was held not
to be an independent contractor, although the court admitted that the
a2Dodds v. Williams, 68 F. Supp. 995 (D. C. Ariz. 1946).
UMoreover, a localliquor law would have been violated if the club had been
compelled to allow the veteran to operate the bar, although he had run such con-
cession under the same law before going to war. Brook v. Winter Haven Golf Club,
69 . Supp. 399 (S. D. Fla. 1946).
"'MacMillan v. Montecito Country Club, 65 F. Supp. 24o (S. D. Cal. 1946).
'1Trank v. Tru-Vue, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 220 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
a'Lee v. Remington Rand, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 837 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
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employers did not consider the rubbish hauler one of their employees
and that "everything they did suggests this."'17
It is agreed that "a position... in the employ of any employer"
"unmistakably includes employees in superior positions and those
whose services involve special skills, as well as ordinary laborers and
mechanics."'I s Under this interpretation of the scope of the Act, pro-
fessional men have secured reinstatement, including an attorney who
had served a town housing authority at a stipulated monthly salary,' 9
and another who had collected accounts of a physician for a fixed
salary plus commissions.20 And a physician who was paid a stated
monthly salary to act as medical director and to take care of all in-
jured employees in a plant, but who also maintained his own office
where he engaged in private practice, was ruled to have held a posi-
tion in the employ of an employer.21
Temporary employees are expressly excluded from the benefits of
compulsory reinstatement, under the terms of the Act. The courts
concur in holding that a person who was employed in a plant which
was in a greatly expanded condition due to the war emergency held
only a temporary "position,22 even though so employed as early as
1940.23 However, an employee who was transferred from the regular
shop to a temporary gun shop did not impliedly consent to being
shifted into a temporary position, the court interpreting "position" to
mean employment, rather than the specific job that was being per-
formed.24 Moreover, a worker who acknowledged in writing that the
natire of his employment was temporary, shortly after be began work,
but whose employment continued thereafter for more than one year
was not considered a temporary employee.2 5 Nor is a position tem-
porary merely because a possibility exists that it may be terminated
17Karas v. Klein, 70 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D. C. Minn. 1947).
'8Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. (2d) 653, 654 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1944).
"Clark v. Housing Authority of Town of Port Orchard, 25 Wash (2d) 419, 171
P. (2d) 217 (1946).
2Meyers v. Barenburg, 68 F. Supp. 697 (D. C. Md. 1946).
""The question here presented, therefore, is not to be solved by the applica-
tion of abstract tests or formulae; but the factors which usually determine the na-
ture of a disputed relationship must be considered in the light of the purpose which
Congress intended to accomplish." Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. (2d)
653, 654 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
"Bryan v. Griffin, 67 F. Supp. 714 (W. D. Ky. 1946).
"Olin Industries, Inc. v. Barnett, 64 F. Supp. 722 (S. D. IlL. 1946); Gualtieri v.
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 219 (E. D. N. Y. 1946).
2"Morgan v. Wheland Co., 66 F. Supp. 439 (E. D. Tenn. 1946).
"Grubbs v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 66 F. Supp. 55o (N. D. Ala. 1946).
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by some future event.2 6 It has also been decided that the second person
inducted from the same position, but not discharged from military ser-
vice until his predecessor had been reemployed in that position, was
merely a temporary employee.
2 7
Seasonal workers have been held to be entitled to reemployment,
under the Act, if they can establish their customary continuance in the
employment and a recognition of their preferential claim to the job
upon resumption of work, even though they entered the armed forces
during the "off-season. '28 Applying this test to a seasonal creamery
employee who, after having worked for five seasons had not been em-
ployed for the sixth season because of the imminence of his induction,
but who nevertheless had worked for over two months of such seasonal
period with a construction company before being inducted, the court
concluded that he was entitled to his former job with the creamery.
2 9
But the test was not satisfactorily met by a football coach who proved
the execution of contracts for his services for seven successive years but
whose last contract had terminated prior to his departure for military
service.3 0
A problem which has troubled the courts is whether a veteran
whose elective term of office or contract of employment expired while
he was serving his country is still in the employ of his pre-war employ-
er. The courts have given a negative answer in regard to a president of
an insurance company who was elected annually by the board of di-
rectors,3 ' a local labor union official who was elected for a one year
term,3 2 and a director of a corporation.3  However, a director of .a
corporation who had received $1o for each meeting he attended and
served as treasurer without pay, but who had been employed for a long
period before he became an officer of the corporation and at the time
of his induction was also being paid $8o a week as office manager and
purchasing agent was held to be entitled to reinstatement.84 And a
26Daniels v. Barfield, 7V F. Supp. 884 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
Salzman v. London Coat of Boston, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 37, (D. C. Mass. 1945),
aff'd 156 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 1st, 1946).
2'United States ex rel. Stanley v. Wimbish, 154 F. (a) 773 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
2'United States ex rel. Unruh v. North American Creameries, Inc., 7o F. Supp.
36 (D. C. N. D. 1947).
"Congregation of Brothers of St. Xavier v. Grone, i6 U. S. L. Week 2292
(C. C. A. 6th, 1947), rev'g 72 F. Supp. 544 (W. D. Ky. 1947)..
"Houghton v. Texas State Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Tex. 1946).
"Fraser v. Shoberg, 65 F. Supp. 83 (E. D. Wash. 1946).
"'Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
'Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., i6o F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3d,
1947).
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first vice-president who had been in active charge of the business for
fifteen years was not considered excluded from reinstatement by the
fact that he had been elected for only one year at a time.3 5 The right
to reemployment was not lost by the fact that a five-year contract ex-
pired for a hotel manager while he was serving as a naval officer,36 and
the same decision was reached in regard to a publicity manager, even
though his employer had the right to refuse to renew the contract upon
its expiration.
37
In a few rather unusual situations the courts have had to determine
whether the veteran in fact had any service relationship with anyone
when he entered military training. One veteran who had completed
training to become a locomotive fireman, but never performed the
services for the employer who trained him, was held not to have been
an employee.38 In two instances, employees who were discharged for
cause after joining the reserve forces but before going on active duty
were held not to have left their positions to enter military service.3 9
Changed Circumstances of Employer
In approximately one-fifth of the cases litigated, a major issue was
whether "the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it
impossible or unreasonable" for the employer to reemploy the re-
turned serviceman. In a number of decisions it has been said that this
exemption is intended "to provide for cases where necessary reduction
of an employer's operating force or discontinuance of some particular
department or activity would mean simply creating a useless job in
order to reemploy the plaintiff."40 But the fact that the employer had
nMcClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md. 1946).
3Williams v. Walnut Park Plaza, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 957 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
3Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. ist, 1947).
11Fields v. Southern Ry. Co., 68 F. Supp. 8ol (E. D. Tenn. 1946).
3McCarthy v. M & M Transp. Co., 16o F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947); Mc-
Clayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md. 1946). But in the follow-
ing situation the right to reinstatement was approved: the employer's chief of police
at a ship-building yard was inducted into the coast guard and then assigned to his
former position in the same yard. The employer continued to pay him the dif-
ference between his former salary and his coast guard pay until the employer
severed connections with him for alleged insubordination; thereupon the chief was
transferred to sea duty. Dacey v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 66 F. Supp. 161 (D. C. Mass.
1946).
'9Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. (2d) 653, 655 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944),
quoted with approval in the following cases: Myers v. Barenburg, 161 F. (2d) 85o,
851 (C. C. A. 4th, 1947); Featherston v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 161 F.
(2d) 1000, 1003 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1947); David v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 F. Supp. 342,
346 (D. C. N. H. 19 4 7);Lord Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711, 727 (W. D. Pa.
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entered into a contract with a third person to replade the serviceman is
not a sufficient change of circumstances to defeat the reemployment
rights of the serviceman, even though such contract has not expired.
41
In one instance, the employer sought to introduce testimony that he
had been able to raise funds to meet a financial crisis only by com-
mitting himself not to pay additional salaries or create new jobs; the
court excluded such testimony, however, because the evidence showed
that the reemployment of the veteran would not have been "un-
reasonable."
42
In some instances the employer has attempted to defend his failure
to reemploy veterans on the ground that the position the. veteran
formerly held had been discontinued during his absence. The fact
that the particular job is no longer in existence is not necessarily a valid
defense,43 unless the employer produces evidence that there is no other
position of like seniority, status, and pay to which the veteran could
be restored. 44 Neither does the changing of the name of the position
constitute a valid "change of circumstances." 45 Nor does the switching
of part of the veteran's pre-war functions from one affiliated corpora-
tion to another in the same chain system relieve either corporation from
its duty to reemploy the veteran.
46
For reemployment to be "unreasonable," it must be more than in-
convenient or undesirable.4 7 Thus, 'the fact that the incumbent in the
position is more efficient than the serviceman seeking reinstatement, 4s
1946). The employer may establish by evidence that the position held by the plain-
tiff at the time he entered the Army had become a more or less overlapping one.
Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
"Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947); Salter v.
Becker Roofing Co., 65 F. Supp. 633 (M. D. Ala. 1946); MacMillan v. Montecito
Country Club, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 240 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
"Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., 162 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3d,
1947).
"Burkhardt v. Crucible Steel Co., 68 F. Supp. 802 (D. C. N. J. 1946); Sullivan
v. West Co., 67 F. Supp. 177 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
"David v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 F. Supp. 342 (D. C. N. H. 1947).
"Rosario v. Department of Labor of Puerto Rico, 68 F. Supp. i (D. C. P. R.
1946).
"Sullivan v. Milner Hotel Co. et al., 66 F. Supp. 607 (E. D. Mich. 1946).
TKay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944). The con-
tention that the efficiency and economy of operation of a business would be im-
paired as a result of thd re-hiring of the veteran is not, in itself, a valid reason for
not complying with the Act. Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., 162
F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3d, 1947).
"Houghton v. Texas State Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Tex. 1946). But
when four veterans sought to compel a baseball club to re-hire them as players,
the club successfully defended itself by showing that its position in the league had
1948]
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and that reemployment of the veteran would also involve additional
expense and be less desirable49 have both been disallowed as defenses.
And the defense of "change of circumstances" was denied to an em-
ployer where he had hired his eighteen-year old son at the same salary
to perform part of the duties previously perforrned by the veteran seek-
ing reinstatement. 50 In another instance, a store manager of eleven
years experience was restored to his position, even though during his
period of military service the store had been moved to a new location
and its physical size and volume of business had been considerably
increased. 51
Several controversies arose out of the fact that while employees were
serving in the armed forces, changes occurred in the ownership of their
former employers' businesses. Thus, when a ranch had been sold dur-
ing the war by the widow of the deceased employer, the veteran was said
not to be entitled to reinstatement in his former position of ranch
manager, in the absence of any suggestion of fraud in the sale, even
though the position was still in existence. 52 And a veteran physician
who had previously been employed by a corporation to render medical
supervision to its employees and to investigate and defend claims was
denied restoration to such position because during the intervening
period the ownership of the corporation had changed and the services
he had formerly performed were now furnished by an insurance car-
rier.53 Yet the fact that the employer had sold part of his business did
not relieve him of his obligation to reemploy a veteran where the em-
ployer remained in active business and still had approximately the
same number of workers as when the plaintiff left to enter the Navy.54
Moreover, incorporation of a business by copartners who had been
former employers of a veteran was not such a change of circumstances
as to make his reemployment impossible or unreasonable. 55
A decided change in the demand for the employer's products or
services may be a valid "change of circumstances." Such has been the
so changed that it now required the services of players of a higher class and stand-
ard than when petitioners were in their line-up. Barisoff et al. v. Hollywood Base-
ball Ass'n, V F. Supp. 493 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
"'Hoyer v. United Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 730 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
60Hoyer v. United Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 73o (S. D. Cal. 1946).
51Mihelich v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 69 F. Supp. 497 (D. C. Idaho 1946).
OMcFadden v. Dienelt et al., 68 F. Supp. 951 (N. D. Cal. 1946).
3Featherston v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 161 F. (2d) ooo (C. C. A.
3d, 1947)-
51Sullivan v. West Co., Inc. et al., 67 F. Supp. 177 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
OKaras v. Klein et al., 70 F. Supp. 469 (D. C. Minn. 1947).
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ruling where the employer had been producing war materials, whether
explosives56 or ships. 57 Because a physician's accounts receivable had
declined from $32,ooo to 56,ooo between 1942 and 1945, he was held
to be justified in refusing to resume salary payments to an attorney
who had been originally employed on a salary and commission basis
to collect the accounts. 58 That a corporation was able to fill only a
fraction of its mail orders, due to scarcity of materials, and did not em-
ploy any salesmen during the war was also upheld as justification for
not reemploying a pre-war salesman.59 But when another employer of
salesmen was marketing only one of the six types of rugs formerly sold
and the one type had to be allotted among customers because of
scarcity, the court held that it was not unreasonable to restore a vet-
eran to his former position as salesman, for the sales of the one rug for
1946 were expected to be six times that of 1941.0
Qualification to Perform Duties
The Act gives reemployment rights only to honorably discharged
service personnel who are "still qualified to perform the duties of such
position." In a case involving a managerial officer of a corporation,
"qualified" was interpreted to mean not only the possession of physi-
cal and mental qualifications but also "temperamental elements con-
sistent with harmonious relations and mutual trust and confidence." 61
It has been held that a veteran may recover his job if he is in fact
not physically unfit, even though declared unfit by the employer's
physician,6 2 such determination of physical capabilities by the em-
ployer's physician not being binding on the district court.68 Obviously,
also, the qualifications of the veteran should be determined by his per-
formance on the job rather than by the employer's preconceived no-
"Olin Industries, Inc., v. Barnett et al., 64 F. Supp. 722 (S. D. INl. 1946).
OKent v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corporation, 72 F. Supp. 506 (S. D. Tex.
1947).
OMeyers v. Barenburg, 161 F. (2d) 85o (C. C. A. 4th, 1947).
,Frank v. Tru-Vue, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 22o (S. D. Ill. 1946).
O'Levine v. Berman, 161 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947), re-hearing denied June
2, 1947.
6'McClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165, 170 (D. C. Md. 1946), quoted
approvingly in Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, i6o F. (2d) 413, 421 (C. C. A. ist, 1947).
Stubbins v. Northrop Aircraft, Inc., 15 U. Sa L. Week 2355 (S. D. Cal. 1946) (nervous
disorder).
2Grasso v. Crowhurst et al., 154 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946), rehearing de-
nied April 23, 1946.
3Parbilla v. Velarde et al., 67 F. Supp. 26o (D. C. P. R. 1946).
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tion;64 and evidence of past performance in pre-war employment has
a bearing upon the applicant's present capabilities. 65 However, an
employer who failed to express any dissatisfaction with the pre-in-
duction services of a veteran until the employer gave that reason as the
ground for refusing him post-war work was not excused from his obli-
gation to reemploy. 66
Post-induction disputes between employers and servicemen have
been raised, usually without success, as excusing refusals to reinstate.
Thus, reemployment was held to be unjustifiably denied by an em-
ployer who alleged that the veteran was planning to open a competi-
tive business and therefore should not be restored to a position in
which he would have access to the employer's records. 67 That the
petitioner, while in military service, had filed suit against the em-
ployer to recover the balance due for pre-induction services was in-
sufficient reason for refusing to rehire the petitioner after his release
from military duty.6s But the employee who threatened during the
war to ruin his employer's business in certain states if the latter re-
fused to sign a five-year post-war employment contract, and who did
persuade some customers to agree to cease purchasing if the employee
so ordered, was not entitled to reemployment. 69 Nor was it reasonable
to require a corporation to reinstate its first vice-president who, after
receiving his naval commission but while still in active charge of the
business, had taken steps to organize a rival corporation and to entice
to it the employees of the first corporation.7 0
The mere fact that the veteran couples his application with a
demand for something which he erroneously believes to be due him
does not cause him to lose his rights under the Act; but when he in-
sists upon such demand and rejects an offer of employment made in
full compliance with the Act, he is not entitled to damages.71
"Freeman v. Gateway Baking Co., 68 F. Supp. 383 (W. D. Ark. 1946).
'sTrusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. Ist, 1947).
"Anderson v. Schouweiler, 63 F. Supp. 8o2 (D. C. Idaho 1945).
67Troy v. Mohawk Shop, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 721 (M. D. Pa. 1946).
"Anderson v. Schouweiler, 63 F. Supp. 802 (D. C. Idaho 1945).-
"Frank v. True-Vue, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 220 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
7'McClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md. 1946).
-Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 16o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. ist, 1947). Thus where
the employer had made a valid offer to reinstate a soldier in his former position at
the previous salary of $5oo a month but the soldier had demanded $750 as salary,
the soldier was not entitled to damages for the failure to reemploy. Tsang v. Kan,
177 P. (2d) 63o (Cal. App. 1947).
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Reemployment for One Year
Various reasons have also been given by employers for alleged vio-
lations of the provision of the Act that veterans restored to positions
"shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one
year after such restoration." "Without cause" has been interpreted as
meaning "the absence of any legal ground or excuse in the performance
of a person's work, which would warrant his being laid off. Converse-
ly it implies that the only 'cause' which would warrant discharge would
be lack of skill, competence, diligence, or loyalty in the performance
of one's duties";72 and it does not absolutely "guarantee that the
veteran will receive a year's wages regardless of his attitude or the
quality of his services." 7 3 A "discharge" means a permanent end to the
employment and not a "lay-off," 74 and the Supreme Court has said that
an employee has not been "discharged" when he has been temporarily
laid off in accordance with the seniority system and put on the wait-
ing list for reassignment.75 Repeated and unexplained absenteeism
and tardiness,78 as well as refusal to obey rules77 or instructions, 78 have
been held as sufficient causes for discharges.
On the other hand, legal relief was granted to a truck driver who
was discharged because he was not a member of the union with which
the employer had a closed shop agreement; but the truck driver had
been originally employed with the consent of the union, which could
not furnish a member driver, and had continued in such employment
for about 3V2 months until his induction. 79 Although lack of skill is
recognized as a legitimate cause of discharge, a baseball club may not
discharge a veteran for inability during his first post-war season with-
out having allowed him actually to participate in a reasonable nuriaber
of games.8 0 In the same case, the court also said that the reemployment
of the veteran had estopped the club from denying his fitness to per-
72Hoyer v. United Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 730, 732 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
7Pelot v. Schott, 7o F. Supp. 981, 982 (M. D. Pa. 1947).
7'Lord Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
75Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp. et al., 328 U. S. 275, 66 S. Ct.
ixo5, 90 L. ed. 1230 (1946).
¢'Manowitz v. Einhorn Wholesale Grocery, 68 F. Supp. 907 (E. D. N. Y. 1946).
7Basham v. Virginia Brewing Co., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 718 (W. D. Va. 1946).
"Pelot v. Schott, 70 F. Supp. 981 (M. D. Pa. 1947); Keserich v. Carnegie-Illinois
Steel Corp., 16 U. S. L. Week 2196 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947).
7ODaniels v. Barfield et al., 71 F. Supp. 884 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
'Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 705 (W. D. Wash.
1946).
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form his duties.8 But where the serviceman's former position was only
a temporary one, such an estoppel was not invoked.
8 2
Restoration to Same or Like Position
The most prolific source of disagreements in the Act appears to be
the requirement that a serviceman shall be restored to his former po-
sition "or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay." In some in-
stances the issue was simply whether the position offered by the em-
ployer was the same as or sufficiently similar to the pre-induction po-
sition occupied by the veteran. Where an employee was working on
a day shift when he was inducted, but his employer had the right to as-
sign him to either a day or night shift, upon reinstatement the employee
was not entitled to work only on the day shift.83 However, the follow-
ing offers by employers have been held not to comply with the Act: to
pay the former salary but to give less authority and fewer duties to the
veteran, whose replacement was retained with the veteran's former
duties and at a salary of $5.00 more a week than was now offered to
the veteran;8 4 to give a traveling salesman new territory in place of
his former territory in which he was well known;8 5 to give reemploy-
ment in a different city where the veteran would have to start anew
and build up the business;8 6 to send a branch manager to the same
position in other States in a new branch office where his commissions
would be less but his salary the same as when formerly employed;8 7
and to assign a store manager to a different store where the surround-
ings were not so pleasant and less money would be made.88 A machinist
who was transferred from the regular shop to a temporary shop, from
which he was inducted, was held to be entitled to similar work in the
regular shop.
8 9
Another question that has arisen is whether the reinstated veteran
"'Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 705, 713 (W. D.
Wash. 1946).
nBryan v. Griffin, 67 F. Supp. 714 (W. D. Ky. 1946).
'3Grubbs v. Ingalls Iron Works, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 550 (N. D. Ala. 1946).
84Troy v. Mohawk Shop, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 721 (N. D. Iowa 1947).
8Whitver v. Aalfs-Baker Mfg. Co., 67 F. Supp. 524 (N. D. Iowa 1946).
"Trusteed Funds, Inc., v. Dacey, x6o F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947). But where
the employer-construction company had a closed shop contract in the city in which
the ex-serviceman had formerly driven a truck, reinstatement to employment in
the same city was denied because the petitioner was not a member of the union.
Bozar v. Central Pennsylvania Quarry Co., 73 F. Supp. 8o 3 (M. D. Pa. 1947).
'Salter v. Becker Roofing Co., 65 F. Supp. 633 (M. D. Ala. 1946).
"sMihelich v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 69 F. Supp. 497 (D. C. Idaho 1946).
"Morgan v. Wheland Co., 66 F. Supp. 439 (E. D. Tenn. 1946).
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should receive his former salary or a larger amount. In several in-
stances the employer has been ordered to pay the amount being re-
ceived by the incumbent.90 And where the former commission of a rug
salesman was Lo% and some salesmen were still being paid 10% when
he applied for reinstatement, the cgurt held that he should be given
the 10io% rate, although by the time of the trial all the salesmen had
had their commissions reduced to 7V% .91 But because the position of
a football coach is of a professional nature, he was said not to be en-
titled to the larger salary that was paid to his replacement.92 Similarly,
where the larger salary paid to the incumbent medical director was
directed solely to the individual, rather than being the result of an
overall company wage policy or an automatic in-grade increase, the
veteran was not automatically entitled to the increased wage paid to
one who filled his position during his absence in the armed forces. 93
It has also been held that the "step-rate pay" system, under which rail-
way clerks were paid on an increased scale on the basis of their ex-
perience in clerical work, did not entitle record clerks to credit, for
time spent in military service of a non-clerical nature;94 but such vet-
erans were given the benefit of general wage increases that had been
granted during their war service. Similarly, where under the union
contract in effect the right to promotion and greater base pay depend
on qualifications beyond mere length of service, the employee may not
be entitled to the advancements in rank and pay which actual experi-
ence in the employment during the period of his military services
might have given him. This ruling was applied to airline pilots whose
army-service time credits gave them sufficient seniority but whose actu-
al flying hours were not sufficient to warrant a higher base pay than
they were receiving after reinstatement to their former positions with
all other seniority privileges.95
n0Thus, a sales manager's former salary of $35 a week was jumped to $125 a
week, Martin v. John S. Doane Co., 68 F. Supp. 783 (D. C. Mass. 1947); a branch
manager's weekly salary of $35 and commission was increased to $45 and com-
mission, Salter v. Becker Roofing Co., 65 F. Supp. 633 (M. D. Ala. 1946); a store
manager received $55 a week rather than his former salary of $5o , Troy v. Mohawk
Shop, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 721 (M. D. Pa. 1946); and a general manager of a car-card
advertising business was entitled to $6oo per month rather than his former $3oo,
Parker v. Maynard Boyce, Inc., 15 U. S. L. Week 2223 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
"Levine v. Berman, 161 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1947).
O-Grone v. Congregation of Brothers of St. Xavier, 72 F. Supp. 544 (W. D. Ky.
1947).
OKay v. General Cable Corporation, 63 F. Supp. 791 (D. C. N. J. 1946).
54Huffman et al. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. et al., 71 F. Supp. 564 (W. D.
Va. 1947).
OHarvey v. Braniff International Airways, Inc., 16 U. S. L. Week 2283 (C. C.
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On the closely related question of whether the reinstated service-
man is entitled to a better position than he occupied when previously
employed, the courts have given apparently conflicting opinions. Ac-
cording to one view, "If the seniority accumulated during the time he
was in the service entitled him [to] a better job classification than he
had at the time he 'entered the service, it is the duty of the employer
to give him this better classification." 96 Taking the same view "that
the veteran .shall enjoy the fruits of seniority which ripen in his ab-
sence," 97 another court held that the petitioner who had been a com-
bination baker, third foreman, and substitute foreman at the time
of his induction was entitled to be reinstated as a second regular fore-
man-the position he would have been promoted to if he had not been
drafted. And a record clerk who had been earning $125 a month when
he left for military training in May, 1942, was entitled to the position
of dispatcher at a weekly pay rate of $47.80 when he returned in July,
1946.98 In still another instance the promotion of a part-time cooper
to the position of regular cooper, in accordance with the worker's war-
time accrued seniority, was ordered.99
According to the opposing view however, "the Act only gives the
right of restoration to the employee's former position or to a position
of 'like seniority, status, and pay.' It does not require.., his restora-
tion to a position of a higher or lower status, or higher or lower pay,
or of different seniority;"' 100 and even a liberal construction "does not
justify a strained construction of facts in order to give a returning
veteran a higher position than the one he occupied at the time he
entered the service, or a new position created after he was in the ser-
vice." 1 In accord with these observations are decisions denying: an
electrician's helper's claim to the position of electrician; 02 a sheet metal
A. 5 th, 1947). In answer to the suggestion of counsel for the pilots that payment
of the $4000 of claims would not hurt the employer and would be of great benefit
to the plaintiffs, the district court said: "That sort of suggestion from a public
official is not appreciated by the court .... Justice does not transfer property on
that basis." 70 F. Supp. 206, 207 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
6Droste v. Nash-Kelvinator Corporation et al., 64 F. Supp. 76, 720 (E. D. Mich.
1946).
"Freeman v. Gateway Baking Co., 68 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W. D. Ark. 1946). Also
Morris v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 16 U. S. L. Week 2283 (N. D. Ind. 1947).
'8Blackford v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 68 F. Supp. 997 (M. D. Tenn. 1946).
"Curtis v. Railroad Perishable Inspection Agency, 71 F. Supp. 153 (D. C. Mass.
1947).
"'Kent v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corporation, 72 F. Supp. 5o6, 509 (S. D.
Tex. 1947).
"°'Meehan v. National Supply Co., 16o F. (2d) 346, 348 (C. C. A. ioth, 1947).
"'Maloney v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 72 F. Supp. 124 (W. D. Mo. 1947).
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worker's helper's application for reinstatement as a sheet metal work-
er;103 and a car cleaner's petition to be classified as a carman helper,
even though eight car cleaners had been promoted to carman helpers
while the petitioner was in the armed forces. 104
Considerable misunderstanding existed for a time on the issue of
"super-seniority"-whether the veteran's seniority right entitled him
to reinstatement even though as a result a non-veteran with greater
seniority would have to be discharged. For example, it had been held
in a district court that, "he is entitled to employment during the first
year even over those non-veteran employees who have seniority su-
perior to that of the returned veteran."' 05 And the Director of Selec-
tive Service had issued an interpretation that the Act required the re-
instatement of the veteran to "his former position or one of like senior-
ity, status, and pay even though such reinstatement necessitates the
discharge of a non-veteran with a greater seniority."' 0 6 But the Su-
preme Court seems to have settled the question in a decision in which
it refused to accept the above administrative interpretation, and held
that "No step-up or gain in priority can be fairly implied."'107
In some cases veterans have contended that they have been de-
nied their rights under the Act by collective bargaining agreements.
The Supreme Court has declared that "no practice of employers or
agreements between employers and unions can cut down the service
adjustment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under
the Act."'108 Thus, in spite of the fact that a union was formed and a
contract made regarding seniority rights during his absence, a vet-
eran was held to be entitled to reemployment with a seniority rating
equal to that which he would have had if he had remained continu-
IwDavid v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 F. Supp. 342 (D. C. N. H. 1947).
IDHeitt v. System Federation No. 152 of Ry Employees' Dept. of A. F. of L.,
161 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1947).
"Whirls v. Trailmobile Co., 64 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S. D. Ohio 1945, rev'd 331
U. S 4o, 67 S. Ct. 982 (1947).
""Local Board Memorandum igo-A, May 20, 1944, Part IV, Sec. i (C).
2m7Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp. et al., 328 U. S. 275, 286, 66 S.
Ct. 11o5, 1111, 90 L. ed. 1230 (1946). The question of the veteran's seniority was
further clarified in the same decision by the statement that "he does not step back
on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back on at the pre-
cise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the
war." 328 U. S. 275, 284-5, 66 S. Ct. 1105, 1111, go L. ed. 1230 (1946). Cf. Pettler
Thompson v. Lyons Transp. Ca., 15 U. S. L. Week 2205 (E D. Pa. 1946).
"TFishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp. et al., 328 U. S. 275, 285, 66,
S. Ct. x105, 1111, 90 L. ed. 1230 (1946).
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ously on the job.1° 9 In another decision it was said that "if the bar-
gaining agreement clashes with the provisions of the Selective Service
Act, then the former must yield.""u 0 However, in four recent decisions
by one court it has been held that a collective bargaining agreement
made during the military absence of employees and giving top senior-
ity to certain union officials is binding upon returning veteran em-
ployees. Under this ruling a serviceman Was not allowed to recover the
difference between the pay he received and the pay he would have re-
ceived in his former position now held by a union official,"' even
though the union official was by actual length of service junior to the
veteran; 1 2 and the veteran was held to have been properly laid off be-
fore the non-veteran union official."13 As justification for this quartet
of decisions the court apparently concluded that the Act gave the vet-
eran no more protection against the loss of position and seniority while
in the armed forces than he would have had if he had remained on the
job continuously or been away on a leave of absence or furlough.
114
The same court also passed upon another collective bargaining
agreement negotiated while the veterans were in military service, by
which seniority was restricted to those occupations in which the em-
ployee had had at least six months experience. In this case the agree-
ment was held to be an unlawful discrimination against veteran em-
ployees who had worked less than six months at the job from which
they were inducted, but it was held binding upon a veteran who had
served for more than six months in the occupation from which he was
inducted but who upon returning claimed seniority in an occupation
in which he had engaged for less tfian six months prior to his pre-in-
duction occupation."15 Where the closed shop agreement required that
all new employees should join the union within ninety days of the date
of their original employment as a condition precedent to their con-
tinued employment, a probationary bus driver who did not join the
10United States ex rel. Unruh v. North American Creameries, Inc., et al., 70
F. Supp. 36 (D. C. N. D. 1947).
'-0See Olin Industries, Inc. v. Barnett et al., 64 F. Supp. 722, 728 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
But see Bozar v. Central Pennsylvania Quarry Co., 73 F. Supp. 8o3 (M. D. Pa.
1947), note 86, supra.
1nKoury v. Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 162 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1947).
12Di Maggio v. Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 162 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 3d, 1947).
'"Payne et al. v. Wright Aeronautical Corporation et al., 162 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A.
3d, 1947); Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 162 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 3d,
1947).
u1Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 162 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 3d, 1947).
"Payne et al. v. Wright Aeronautical Corporation et al., 162 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A.
3d, 1947).
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union during the eighty-five days he worked prior to his induction
was held to have been properly refused seniority rights as of the date of
his original employment and properly required to serve a new pro-
bationary period of ninety days.116 And where a rule existed that an
employee may return to his former position without loss of seniority
if he failed to qualify for a new position within thirty days, a plaintiff
who had withdrawn from a mine workers' union and waived his
seniority rights conditional upon his qualifying as a machinist and
receiving such position, but who had failed to receive such appoint-
ment, was entitled to restoration of his full seniority rights upon his
return from military duty. Apparently in this instance the employee
had entered military service before the expiration of the thirty-day
period, for the court found that the thirty-day period "means thirty
qualifying or working days rather than thirty calendar days.""17 In
another case the union contract in force when the veteran applied for
reinstatement required that bus drivers who had been on a leave of
absence could either participate in a "pick" of runs or go on the "extra
list." The veteran did not take part in the "pick" and was offered only
a place at thd top of the "extra list." Because the veteran did not
allege that the system was less favorable to an absentee than the one in
force when he entered military training, the court ruled that he had
been offered a position similar to his pre-war position.1 s Finally, the
Supreme Court has held that the special standing given to veterans
by the Act-in that for "the statutory year ... the restored rights could
not be altered adversely by the usual processes of collective bargaining
or of the employer's administration of general business policy""19 -does
not extend longer than their first year of reemployment.
Period for Application for Reemployment
The statutory period within which the serviceman must make ap-
plication for reemployment begins to run on the date of his final dis-
charge from military service, rather than on the date of his release
from active duty to reserve status.120 An application for reemploy-
ment made eleven days before discharge was interpreted as a continu-
ing application after the date of discharge;' 2' and a veteran's request
u Johnson v. Interstate Transit Lines, 7 F. Supp. 882 (D. C. Utah 1946).
""Riggle v. Cincinnati Union Terminal, 71 F. Supp. 456 (S. D. Ohio 1947).
" Feore v. North Shore. Bus Co., Inc., 161 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
229Trailmobile Company et al. v. Whirls, 33i U. S. 40, 58-59, 67 S. Ct. 982, 991,
91 L. ed. 939 (1947)-
'OTipper v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 62 F. Supp. 853 (W. D. Wash. 1945).
"'Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 938 (D. C. N. J.
1946), aff'd on this point 162 F. (2d) ioo7 (C. C. A. 3d, 1947).
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for a leave of absence to enable him to have his feet treated, made
within the statutory period but before the veteran had returned to
work, was also construed to have been a valid "application for reem-
ployment."'122 Alleging that the resumption of his pre-war employment
would have made him liable to re-induction, a soldier over 38 years
old who was discharged from the Army on the representation that he
would engage in essential war work did not apply for reinstatement
to his pre-war job within ninety days after his discharge but instead
did obtain employment in essential war work. The court held that his
failure to apply within the statutory period had resulted in his loss
of reemployment rights in his pre-war position.123
Damages for Failure to Reemploy
Questions have also arisen concerning the compensation which dis-
trict courts are authorized to grant servicemen for wages and benefits
which they have lost because of the employer's non-compliance with
the Act. The veteran may maintain an independent action to recover
the earnings which he would have received had he been reemployed
when he made application for reinstatement,.24 even if he has since
been restored to the job 2 5 or is not attempting to require that his
employer rehire him. 126 Correspondingly, a veteran who was entitled to
restoration in employment within five days after he applied was
awarded his wages for the twenty-two working days which intervened
before he was reinstated; 27 and a typewriter salesman was allowed to
recover his average monthly commissions of $5o0 for the months dur-
ing which he was denied reemployment. 28 But where war-time scarci-
ties had decreased the earnings of the position, a golf pro's damage
was ruled to be only the amount being paid his replacement, rather
than his average pre-war monthly income.129
Where there has been an unreasonable delay by the veteran in in-
stituting court action after the refusal of reinstatement, compensation
has been allowed only from the date such proceedings were started,2 0
'-Grasso v. Crowhurst et al., 154 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946), rehearing de-
nied April 23, 1946.
'Cox v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 161 F. (2d) 68o (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
'Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
2'Feore v. North Shore Bus Co., Inc., 1i6 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
'-"Kent v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corporation, 72 F. Supp. 5o6 (S. D. Tex.
1947)-
I'Donaldson v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 681 (N. D. Ala. 1946).
'-'Lee v. Remington Rand, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 837 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
2'MacMillan v. Montecito Country Club, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 240 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
' 0Karas v. Klein et al, 7o F. Supp. 469 (D. C. Minn. 1947); Dacey v. Bethlehem
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rather than from the date of application for, or refusal of, reemploy-
ment, unless the delay was not attributable to the applicant.13 1 When
an employee's petition for reinstatement was dismissed by the district
court but such dismissal was reversed on appeal, he was allowed com-
pensation from the date of the institution of his petition to the date
of the lower court's opinion and from the date of the reversal to his
reinstatement, but not for the period during which the decision in
favor of the employer was unreversed.
3 2
In some cases it has been said that for the veteran to recover full
compensation he must have made a bona fide effort to obtain other
employment in order to mitigate the damages, 133 and his failure to
do so has resulted in a reduction of the award.'3 4 Reduction of dam-
ages in accordance with the veteran's earnings in other employment is
within the discretion of the trial court, 35 and such reduction has been
made in some cases.' 36 In one instance the Servicemen's Readjustment
Allowance pay received by the veteran was included in the reduction
of damages, 137 but in two other cases such allowances were not de-
ducted because they were not considered "earnings."'13 While vet-
erans are entitled to compensation, 39 no recovery was granted for a
layoff period of nine days.' 40 Finally, it has uniformly been held that
where vacations and vacation pay are regulated by labor union con-
tracts, the provision of the Act that persons in the armed forces shall
be considered as on furlough or leave or absence from their employ-
ment does not enable veterans to obtain vacations or vacation pay un-
less their periods of actual employment conform to the technical re-
quirements of the labor union contract.
1 41
Steel Co., 66 F. Supp. 161 (D. C. Mass. 1946); accord, Azzerone v. W. B. Coon Co.,
73 F. Supp. 869 (W. D. N. Y. 1947)
=Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, Inc., 162 F. (2d) 1o7 (C. C. A.
3 d, 1947).
U2Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 59 F. Supp. 358 (D. C. N. J. 1945).
wHoughton v. Texas State Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Tex. 1946).
W'Martin v. John S. Doane Co., 68 F. Supp. 783 (D. C. Mass. 1947); Dodds v.
Williams, 68 F. Supp. 995 (D. C. Ariz. 1946).
= Boston & M. R. R. v. Bentubo, 16o F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. ist, 1947).
'Boston & M. R. R. v. Bentubo, .6oF. (gd) 326 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947); Dacey v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 66 F. Supp. 16i (D. C. Mass. 1946); Salter v. Becker Roofing
Co., 65 F. Supp. 633 (M. D. Ala. 1946). But see MacKnight v. Twin Cities Broad-
casting Corp., 6 U. S. L. Wee), 2205 (D. C. Minn. 1947).
=Salter v. Becker Roofing Co., 65 F. Supp. 633 (M. D. Ala 1946).
ITroy v. Mohawk Shop, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 721 (M. D. Pa. 1946); Hoyer v.
United Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 730 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
Hoyer v. United Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 730 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
lAOFishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp et al., 328 U. S. 275, 66 S. Ct.
11o5, 9o L. ed. 1230 (1946).
t mMacLaughlin et al. v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 72 F. Supp. 284 (W. D. Pa.
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Conclusion
The fact that only about a hundred veterans, out of the millions
who have been returned to civilian life, have seen fit to resort to the
courts for help in enforcing their reemployment rights is overwhelm-
ing proof that employers generally have willingly complied with the
statute. The small number of suits against employers cannot be ac-
counted for by any claim that the veterans were deterred from bring-
ing suit by the expenses of litigation, for the Act entitles the veteran
in such suits to have the federal district attorney act for him, and to
be immune from fees or court costs. Moreover, in the cases that have
been litigated, the courts have been almost unanimous in construing
the provisions of the Act liberally so as to effectuate the intention of
Congress142-i.e., with a view to assuring reemployment to veterans,
whenever feasible. It seems apparent, therefore, that the legislation has
been remarkably effective in achieving its purposes.
RAYMOND E. FEED
1947) and 7o F. Supp. 744 (W. D. Pa. 1947); Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 69 F. Supp. 384
(W. D. N. Y. 1947). But see Randolph v. Seattle Star, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 57 (TV. D.
Wash. 1947) (severance pay).
""In at least twenty-one opinions the following statement of the Supreme Court
has been quoted with approval: "This legislation is to be liberally construed for
the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of need."
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp. et al., 328 U. S. 275, 285, 66 S. Ct.
iio 5 , iiii, go L. ed. 1230 (1946).
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THE LAW SCHOOL
The School of Law of Washington and Lee University opened its
99 th session on October 16, 1947. Final registration for the Fall Term,
1947 totals 238, divided as follows:
1st Term-6 9  2d Term-42
3 d Term-38 4 th Term-39
5 th Term-25 6th Term-25
Of the total enrollment 224 are veterans. All candidates for the degree
of Bachelor of Laws have completed at least one-half of the require-
ments for a collegiate Bachelor's degree; 112 held a collegiate degree at
the time of admission; 17 received a collegiate degree under the com-
bined programs in Arts and Law or Commerce and Law; and 38 have
completed at least three years of college work.
The accelerated program of a three-semester academic year, which
was inaugurated in 1946 to assist returning veterans whose law study
was interrupted, will be discontinued with the ending of the Summer
Term, 1948. Commencing the Fall semester, 1948 the School of Law
will return to the two-semester academic year, beginning law students
to be admitted at subsequent Fall and Spring Semesters. No beginning
law students are being admitted at the Spring or Summer Terms, 1948,
but the regular program of second and third year courses will be given
at the Summer Term, 1948.
Representatives of the law student body attended the National Law
Student Conference on Legal Education in New York City, July 11 and
12, 1947. The conference afforded to law students a valuable op-
portunity to express and exchange their views on present-day legal
education.
Members of the Law Faculty attended the Southern Law Review
Conference at Nashville, Tennessee in April, 1947; the meeting of the
American Law Institute at Washington, D. C., in June, 1947; the an-
nual meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association at Roanoke in
August, 1947; the Southeastern Regional Conference of Teachers in
Association -Law Schools, held at the University of South Carolina,
-Columbia, S. C., in August, 1947; the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools at Chicago during December, 1947;
and the winter meeting of the State Board of Bar Examiners at Rich-
mond in January, 1948.
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The Charles Allison Menkemeller Memorial Scholarships have
been established under the will of Mrs. Martha Menkemeller of Wheel-
ing, West Virginia, which provided the sum of $2oo,ooo for the estab-
lishment of a number of law scholarships in memory of her son, Charles
Allison Menkemeller, a member of the Law Class of 1915. The value of
these scholarships is $175 for each term, payable in cash. They are
available to graduates of approved colleges who ace beginning the study
of law, and will continue for the full six semesters of study, provided
the holder maintains the standards set by the Law Faculty. Award of
the Menkemeller Scholarships is made by a faculty committee on the
basis of character, outstanding scholastic attainment and promise of
future usefulness to the legal profession. The financial need of appli-
cants will be given consideration. Applications for these scholarships
must be filed not later than July i, preceding the commencement of the
academic year for which they are effective.
The University Board of Trustees has established the John Ran-
dolph Tucker Memorial Lectures to be delivered annually and pub-
lished in a bound volume. The initial lectures will be delivered in
1948-49 during the Bicentennial of the University by the Honorable
John W. Davis, a distinguished member of the Law Class of 1895, and
will commemorate the iooth anniversary of the establishment of the
School of Law.
There have been no changes since 1946 in the permanent Law
Faculty, which includes Dean Clayton E. Williams, Professor Raymon
T. Johnson, Professor Charles R. McDowell, Professor Charles P.
Light, Jr., Associate Professor Charles V. Laughlin, and Associate Pro-
fessor and Law Librarian Theodore A. Smedley. Mr. Carter Glass, III
of the Lynchburg, Virginia Bar, has been added to the Faculty as Lec-
turer in Taxation, and Mr. William L. Martin of the Roanoke, Vir-
ginia Bar as Lecturer in Virginia Procedure. Mr. Martin succeeds Mr.
Martin P. Burks, III, who was Lecturer in Virginia Procedure during
the Fall Term, 1947. Mrs. C. R. McDowell continues to serve as As-
sistant Law Librarian and Law School Secretary.
The law curriculum during the academic year 1947-48 follows on
page 72.
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Criminal Law and Procedure















SECOND AND TIRD YEARS
(elective courses; * denotes courses
given in alternate years)
Administrative Law
Bankruptcy
Damages
Domestic Relations
Federal Procedure
*Insurance
Labor Law
Mortgages
*Municipal Corporations
*Property III
Property IV
Public Utilities
Suretyship
Taxation
Taxation Seminar
Trade Regulation
Virginia Procedure I
Virginia Procedure II
*Wills and Administration
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